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The Returns From
Informal Venture Capital Investments:
An Exploratory Study
Annareetta Lumme
Colin Mason
Markku Suomi

Despite the recent increase in research on informal venture capital there are many
aspects of this market for which no information exists. One such issue is exits. This
exploratory study is the first to address this issue. It is based on a survey of 38 active
business angels in Finland who had made a total of 155 investments; 20 of these inves
tors had made 49 exits. Two aspects are addressed. First, evidence is presented on
investment performance and the timing and method of exit. Second, the paper explores
differences between those investors with a successful track-record of exits and those
with an unsuccessful track-record. Differences are identified in terms of motivations for
investing, volume and sources of information on investment opportunities, prior rela
tionship with investee businesses, perception of value-added and employment back
ground. However, conclusions should only be regarded as suggestive in view of the
small numbers involved.

I. INTRODUCTION
There is little dispute that the informal venture capital market represents the largest
source of external equity finance available for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and is significantly larger than the professional venture capital market.^
For example, Gaston (1989) suggests that in the USA professional venture capital
funds make forty times fewer investments in SMEs than informal investors—or
business angels as they are better known—and invest less than one-tenth of the
amount invested by business angels. Estimates for the UK and Finland both sug
gest that the informal venture capital market is at least twice as large as the institu
tional venture capital market in terms of the amount invested (Harrison & Mason,
1993; Suomi & Lumme, 1994).
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Furthermore, business angels are the dominant source of finance at the forma
tion and early growth stages of new venture development. Studies of the invest
ment portfolios of business angels suggest that 70 to 80% of their investments are
in seed, start-up and early stage businesses (Gaston, 1989; Harrison & Mason,
1992a; Landstrom, 1993; Mason &, Harrison, 1994). Research into the financing of
new high technology-based firms (NTBFs) in the USA also finds that “private
investors exhibit a significantly higher propensity to invest at the seed and start-up
stages than other investors.... In fact, private individuals provided the seed capital
that launched the majority of NTBFs in the sample’ (Freear & Wetzel, 1990, pp.
88-89). In similar vein, Roberts (1990, p. 84) has observed that “the great major
ity” of the initial financing of new technology enterprises through outside investors
has been undertaken by business angels. Yet despite this evidence of the impor
tance of the informal venture capital market as a source of early stage venture cap
ital, the amount of research that has examined its characteristics and operation
remains remarkably limited.
The pioneering studies of the informal venture capital market in the early and
mid 1980s that were undertaken in the USA with funding from the US Small Busi
ness Administration (e.g. Wetzel, 1981; Wetzel and Seymour, 1981; Arum Asso
ciates, 1987, Gaston & Bell, 1986; 1988; Gaston, 1989) simply sought to “put
boundaries on our ignorance” (Wetzel, 1986, p 131). International interest in the
topic led to studies in Canada (e.g. Short & Riding, 1989; Riding et al, 1993), the
UK (Mason & Harrison, 1994), and the Nordic countries (Landstrom, 1993;
Lumme & Suomi, 1994). As a result, there is now a fairly good understanding of
what might be called the “ABC of business angels”^—^their investment activity,
behaviour and characteristics. In addition, there have also been a number of poUcyrelated studies which have been concerned primarily with initiatives to stimulate
informal venture capital activity through the introduction of business angel net
works (e.g. Mason & Harrison, 1995a; Harrison & Mason, 1996).
Thus, progress in informal venture capital research has primarily involved a
“widening” of our understanding by addressing ABC-type issues in a variety of
geographical contexts. This restricted focus has led to a call for a “deepening” of
research. In their research agenda towards the year 2000, Freear & Wetzel (1992,
p. 483) proposed that more attention should be given “to the need to develop
explanatory and predictive theories for empirical testing.” Some progress has been
made in this direction, for example, by Landstrom (1992) who has examined the
business angel-entrepreneur relationship in an agency theory context and by Fiet
(1995) who has examined risk avoidance strategies of business angels and venture
capitalists and how this relates to their use of networks of informants. Some new
avenues of enquiry have also emerged. Examples include studies of the demandside (e.g. Freear & Wetzel, 1990; Freear, Wetzel & Sohl, 1995), the decision-mak
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ing process (Mason & Harrison, 1996a; Mason & Rogers, 1996; 1997) and the
post-investment relationship (e.g. Mason & Harrison, 1996b).
Nevertheless, there remain many aspects of the informal venture capital mar
ket for which no information exists and where Wetzel’s call for research which
puts boundaries on our ignorance remains valid and appropriate.^ One such issue
concerns the performance of informal venture capital investments and the harvest
ing of such investments (Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 1996). Although there is some
evidence on the expectations of business angels, in terms of their exit horizon,
method of exit, the rate of return and proportion of “winners” and “losers” (Wetzel,
1981; Tymes & Krasner, 1983; Mason & Harrison, 1994) there have been no stud
ies of the actual returns achieved by business angels nor their actual timing and
method of exit.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant void in our knowledge of the
informal venture capital market by examining the exits made by a sample of Finn
ish business angels. The paper first looks at the aggregate pattern of exits and then
explores differences between successful and unsuccessful investors.

n. METHODOLOGY
Business angels are extremely difficult to identify. They have a preference for ano
nymity, there are no directories of individual investors and no public records of
their investment transactions (Wetzel, 1981; 1987). They may also be reluctant to
respond to research surveys because of the private and personal nature of the sub
ject matter and the fear of being identified and then deluged with investment pro
posals (Haar etal, 1988). The size and characteristics of the population of informal
investors is therefore unknown, and probably unknowable (Wetzel, 1981).
Because the population is not known, this means that it is not possible to test any
sample of business angels for its representativeness.
The approach that was used in this study"^ was based on evidence from a
review of previous studies that the most effective method of both identifying busi
ness angels and obtaining a high response rate is by personal contact through “net
working” (Mason & Harrison, 1994). Moreover, as investors tend to be linked by
friendship and business networks, identification of an initial group of informal
investor typically leads to an introduction to others. A list of 151 names was com
piled following approaches to a business mentor organisation and to business pro
fessionals (e.g. venture capitalists, science park managers) plus referrals from the
investors identified by these two sources. Contact with these individuals led to
completed face-to-face interviews with 59 of them, comprising 38 active and 21
potential business angels. The active angels had made a total of 155 investments in
unquoted companies and 20 investors had exited from 49 of them. It is these inves
tors and these exits that are the subject of this paper.
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A number of limitations to the study should be noted at the outset. The first,
and most significant, limitation is that the exit information is not deal specific but
is only investor specific. Second, the number of exits is relatively small. This
reflects the inherent difficulties in identifying business angels, the small popula
tion of business angels that exist in a country the size of Finland (5 miUion popu
lation) and the underdeveloped nature of its equity culture. Indeed a formal venture
capital industry has only been in existence in Finland since the late 1980s. Thus,
the concept of making informal venture capital investments is relatively new. The
small number of exits prevents any statistical analysis from being undertaken.
Third, the sample is likely to be biased towards the more active business angels in
Finland. As such, these investors may have a high average number of exits. Fourth,
there may be a bias in favour of investors with a strong interest in investing in tech
nology businesses because of the networking sources used to identify business
angels.
III. ACTIVE BUSINESS ANGELS IN FINLAND: AN OVERVIEW
Personal Characteristics
Based on this sample (Suomi & Lumme, 1994), Fiimish business angels
broadly conform to the profile identified in studies of business angels in other
countries. In terms of their personal characteristics active business angels in Fin
land are predominantly males (95%) and the majority are aged between 40 and
60 (67%). In this respect Finnish business angels are somewhat older than those
identified in the USA and the UK, but similar in age to Swedish business angels
(Landstrom, 1993) which no doubt reflects the higher tax rates in Nordic coun
tries, meaning that it takes longer to achieve a high net worth. Finnish business
angels are also well educated: 56% have a Masters degree, which is the basic uni
versity degree in Finland, and a further 8 % have a Ph.D. Nearly half (48%) have
backgrounds in technology and over one-third have backgrounds in commerce
(38%).
Finnish business angels are extremely entrepreneurial: 95% of active business
angels have participated in the founding of at least one company; the median num
ber of companies founded by the sample is five and the median number of years of
experience as an entrepreneur is 15. In addition, half have also held top manage
ment positions in large companies (median of 10 years experience). Not surpris
ingly, the main source of wealth of the sample of active angels is derived from
these entrepreneurial efforts. Only 16% of business angels reported that their main
source of wealth was inherited.
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Deal Flow and Investment Activity
The sample of active business angels receive a median of six investment pro
posals per year, with 80% receiving fewer than 10 proposals. The most frequent
source of information on investment opportunities is business contacts and friends.
However, venture capital firms, although a source of information for only a minor
ity of business angels, was rated as providing the best quality of information on
investment opportunities. In the three years prior to the survey the business angels
had received a total of 330 investment opportunities; 3 or 4 out of every 10 were
seriously considered from which one investment was made.
Investment Characteristics
Business angels in Finland typically make relatively small investments. Three
quarters of investments involved amounts of less than FM 800,000 (approx.
$175,000).^ By comparison, the average venture capital investment in Finland is
FM 2 million. Nevertheless, larger investments do occur, and 25% of investors
had, at some stage, made investments which exceeded FM 3 million ($650,000).
Their investments are concentrated at the seed (23%), start-up (29%) and early
stage (23%) of new venture development: indeed, these stages account for threequarters of all the investments made by the sample of active business angels. Their
investments are also more often in manufacturing (65%) than services (35%).
About 40% of investments (62% of manufacturing investments) were in high tech
nology sectors. Finnish investors, just Uke those in the USA and UK, exhibit a
marked preference for investing in businesses located close to home: 60% of
investments were located within 50 km of their home or office.
Just over half of all investments by Finnish business angels are syndicated,
normally with other business angels (43%) but occasionally with venture capital
funds (9%). Moreover, it is quite conomon for the business angel or syndicate not
to be the only external investor in the business. A further one-quarter of businesses
in which the sample of business angels had invested had raised finance indepen
dently, either before, after or at the same time, from another business angel or a
venture capital fund.
In a majority of cases the investor had some kind of formal or informal link or
knowledge of the company before making their investment. The most common
connection was simply that the investor knew the owner or management team
(43%). However, in some cases (8 %) the investor had been in some form of busi
ness relationship (e.g. supplier, customer) or had been a consultant or mentor (8 %).
Moreover, in those 40% of cases in which the firm had been unknown to the inves
tor in this study it is possible that a syndicate member had links with the firm.
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EXIT ACTIVITY

Aggregate Evidence
The sample of business angels had made a total of 49 exits. In those cases for
which information on returns was supplied (n = 40) one-third provided a signifi
cant or modest return to their investor, and 1 in 5 provided significant financial
returns (an IRR in excess of 20%), while at the other extreme just over half resulted
in a partial (18%) or full (38%) loss (Table 1). This compares with Finnish venture
capital companies which reported 1 in 3 of their exits in 1993 to have been profit
able. Taken at face value this would suggest that business angels have a similar
success rate to professional venture capital firms. This is particularly noteworthy
when the different stages of investments by business angels and venture capital
funds are considered. Unlike their counterparts in other European countries, Finn
ish venture capital funds make a high proportion of their investments in businesses
at the early stage of development (EVCA, 1995). However, as noted earlier, most
of the investments made by business angels are at even earlier stages. Neverthe
less, it needs to be emphasised that this is a very inexact comparison because the
exits by business angels have been made over a number of years whereas the ven
ture capital exits relate to just one year.
Conventional wisdom in the venture capital industry states that “lemons ripen
more quickly than plums.” In other words, problem investments typically appear
before the profits from successful investments can be realised through the sale of
the shares. This aspect of venture capital investing is confirmed in this study as
being equally relevant to the informal venture capital market. The average time to
exit for successful investments (i.e. any investment from which the retum was
greater than break-even) was 5.09 years. In comparison, the time to exit for unsuc
cessful investments (i.e. exits which involved a partial or full loss of the amount
invested) was just 2.82 years, which reflects the vulnerability to closure of busiTable I
The Performance of Informal Investments From
Which Business Angels Had Exited
Return

% ofExits^

Significant return^
Modest return^
Break-even
Partial loss
Total loss

20
13
13
16
38

Notes: ®Significant retum: IRR > 20%;
^ Modest retum: IRR < 20%;
n = 40.

Informal Venture Capital Investments

145

nesses in their early years after start-up (Storey, 1994, p. 93). A further contribu
tory factor is that successful investors will not rush to harvest their investments but
will patiently build value in their investee companies before seeking an exit
(Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Investors exited from those investments on which
they broke even in an average of 1.80 years.
In those cases in which the shares had some value and could be sold, the
most common exit routes by business angels were a sale to other shareholders in
the firm and sale to a third party. Only 16% of exits were achieved through trade
sales (i.e. acquisition by another company) and there were no public listings
(Table 2). However, the type of exit route was related to the success of the invest
ment. The most frequent exit routes for successful investments were trade sales
and sales to a third party, whereas sale to existing shareholders was the most
common exit route for loss-making investments (Table 2 ). Trade sales are also
the most common way in which venture capital funds realise the value of their
investments (Abbott and Hay, 1995).
Initial public offerings (IPOs) often produce a higher price than trade sales
(although the extent of any price differential will depend on the buoyancy of the
stock market for IPOs). However, this is influenced by the fact that IPOs are the
“cream of the crop” whereas trade sales will include companies that are purchased
by large companies for strategic purposes, and for this reason may be willing to
pay a high price, as well the more moderate performing investments and also dis
tress sales (Bygrave Sc Timmons, 1992; Abbott & Hay, 1995). An IPO is also only
practicable for larger companies that are able to justify a significant market capi
talisation. For these reasons a trade sale will be the only exit option available to
business angels in most cases.
A trade sale also has two distinct advantages over an IPO and so may be
favoured by many investors. First, the price is fixed whereas the returns from an
IPO, which depends on the issue price, are uncertain. Second, investors will nor
mally be able to sell all of their shares through a trade sale (indeed, the buyer may
insist upon 100% control) whereas in an IPO the market may construe an investor
selling all of his shares as a negative signal. Thus, an investor may only be able to
reaUse the full value of their investment through an IPO exit over a period of time,
during which time the share price may fall. Indeed, a number of recent studies note
that the long-run performance of IPO shares under-perform the market (Leleux &
Manigart, 1994). In the case of what venture capitalists call “the living dead”, that
is investments which have failed to meet expectations and are unlikely to produce
a profitable exit, but nonetheless have a stable existence, the only exit route avail
able is likely to be through a repurchase of the shares by the existing management
team. Comparison between the exit routes of business angels and professional ven
ture capital companies in Finland (Table 3) confirms that the most common exit
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Table 2
Exit Routes
Return
Significant Modest
Return
Return
Listing on public
market
Trade sale
Sale of shares to 3rd
party
Sale of shares to
other shareholders
Shares have no
value
Total

—

—

4
2
2
—

8

Break
even
—

2
3

Partial
Loss

Total
Loss

—

2
—

No
Informa
tion

—

—

Total
—

1

1

3

8
10

—

—

—

—

2

4

1

3

12

—

1

2

13

3

19

5

7

15

9

49

5

Table 3
Exit Routes by Finnish Venture Capital Funds
Number o f Exits
1993

1994

Trade sale
Sale to 3rd party
Sale to other shareholders in the company
Pay back of convertible loan
Written-off/ending of operations
Bankruptcy

3
3
11
2
7
9

2
1
11
13
6
16

Total

35

49

Exit Route

Source:

Finnish Venture Capital Association.

route of venture capitalists is also sale to other shareholders in the company; how
ever, a trade sale is a more common exit route for business angels.
Current Portfolio—^Performance and Exit Expectations
Business angels find it difficult to estimate the performance of their current
investments, particularly in comparison with their expectations at the time of
investment. Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, it is clear that investments per
forming below expectations exceed those performing above expectation by ratio of
1.5:1. While differences in time periods render comparisons problematic, it would
nevertheless appear that the portfolios of Finnish business angels contain a slightly
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Dable4

Anticipated Exit Routes for Current Portfolio
Exit Route

% of Investments

Don’t know
Don’t plan to sell
Business will fail
Sale to other shareholders
Sale to 3rd party
Trade sale
Public listing

33
12
4
15
13
20
4

higher proportion of investments performing below expectations than those of UK
business angels. In turn, UK business angels have a higher proportion of invest
ments performing below expectations than US business angels (Mason & Harri
son, 1994; Gaston, 1989).
A significant proportion of business angels does not have a clear exit strategy
(Table 4), suggesting that exit plans are often not made at the time of the invest
ment (cf. Mason & Harrison, 1996b). In terms of their exit horizons, 52% of inves
tors anticipated holding their investments for three to five years. However, in 12%
of cases the intention is to retain the investment indefinitely. These investors might
be “income-seeking angels” whose motive for investing is to generate an income
stream (and perhaps also a job) rather than a capital gain (Stevenson & Coveney,
1996). A trade sale is the most common anticipated exit route (Table 4).
V. A COMPARISON OF “SUCCESSFUL” AND
“UNSUCCESSFUL” INVESTORS
Clearly, the investment performance of business angels has been variable. This
raises a number of questions concerning the factors that influence investment per
formance. This section of the paper is concerned with two specific questions. First,
are certain kinds of investors more successful than others? Second, are certain
strategies for investing more successful than others?
In order to address these questions the 20 investors who had made exits were
asked to rate the exit success of each investment that they had exited from.^ Inves
tors were given a score for each exit, ranging from one point for a very successful
exit to five points for an exit that resulted in a total loss.^ This enabled two groups
of investors to be identified:
• a successful group, comprising 6 investors, with an average score of 2 or
below (average success score of 1.31)
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investors, with an average score of

In fact, every exit of the successful investors identified in this way had been
profitable. Similarly, the unsuccessful investors identified through this procedure
had not made any profitable exits. A further five investors could not be allocated
to either group because their exit performance was variable, with both successful
and unsuccessful exits, and insufficient information was available on the exit per
formance of one investor. The following analysis excludes these six investors.
The successful group had made a total of 10 exits (ranging from 1 to 3)
whereas the unsuccessful group had made total of 17 exits (ranging from 1 to 6 ).
The median number of exits for each group was the same (1.5) but the mean num
ber of exits was higher for the unsuccessful group (2.1 cf. 1.7).
Clearly, the small number of investors prevents us from reaching definitive
conclusions based on rigorous statistical analysis. However, as noted earlier,
research on informal venture capital activity frequently confronts the problem of
small sample sizes because of the difficulties in identifying business angels, espe
cially in small countries. Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the topic and
the total absence of any previous research on business angel exits we believe that
the following analysis is not without merit and that the findings can at least be
regarded as suggestive.
Personal Characteristics
Both successful and unsuccessful investors are of similar ages (average of 54
years old), have had similar levels of education (Masters degree) and have similar
educational backgrounds (technical/commercial). Both groups of investors have
also had similar lengths of entrepreneurial career and have founded similar num
bers of businesses (means of 7.1 for successful investors and 6 . 8 for unsuccessful
investors; medians of 6 . 8 and 5.5). There are also no differences in sources of
wealth, with dividends from, and sale of, their own company being the most com
mon. The only clear difference between the two groups of investors is in terms of
their work experience. Successful investors have spent more time working in top
management positions in large and medium-sized companies and in middle man
agement positions, whereas unsuccessful investors have spent more time working
in top management positions in small companies (Table 5).*
Motivations for Investing
Investors were asked to rate a series of statements on motivations on a five
point scale (4 to 0, with 4 = very important reason for investing) according to their
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Tables
Work Experience of Successful and Unsuccessful Investors

Large company, top management
Medium-sized company.
top management
Small company.
top management
Middle management in
any size of company
Professional
Civil service, top level

Successful
Investors
Mean
Number of
Years

Unsuccessful
Investors
Mean
Number of
Years

Successful
Investors
Median
Number of
Years

Unsuccessful
Investors
Median
Number of
Years

5.5
5.3

2.1
0.6

6.5
5.0

0
0

4.2

15.6

3.0

12.0

10.2

3.9

10.0

2.0

3.7
0

3.4
0

2.5
0

0
0

importance as a motive for investing. Of the 15 statements, successful and unsuc
cessful investors diverged on just four (difference of more than 0.5). Successful
investors gave higher average scores to two statements; “investing in an interesting
company is exciting” (3.0 cf. 2.4) and “I want to use my leisure time in an interest
ing and beneficial way” (2.8 cf. 1.9) Unsuccessful investors also gave a higher
average score to two statements: “I want to take an active role in developing a
promising SME” (3.4 cf. 2.7) and “I fulfil my role in society by investing in SMEs”
(2.1 cf. 1.3). The tentative conclusion that can be drawn is that successful investors
are motivated to a greater extent than unsuccessful investors by the “buzz” that
they get from being a business angel whereas altruism is a more important motiva
tional consideration for unsuccessful investors.
Reasons for Rejecting an Investment Opportunity
It might have been anticipated that successful and unsuccessful investors differ
in terms of the way in which they evaluate investment opportunities. However,
there are no observable differences in the reasons given for rejecting investment
opportunities. Issues associated with the management of the company is the key
consideration for both groups of investors.
Deal Flow and Investment Activity
Successful investors receive a higher number of investment opportunities per
year than unsuccessful investors (Table 6 ). Successful investors have also made
fewer investments than unsuccessful investors and have invested smaller amounts
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Table 6
Number Of Investment Opportunities and Number of Investment Made
Unsuccessjul
Investors

Successful
Investors

Number of in estment opportunities (per year)
Number of investment made
Amount invested (million FM)

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

12.2
2.8
1.45

7.5
2.5
1.2

8.5
4.5
5.0

4.0
5.5
3.75

of finance (Table 6 ). It might be expected, purely on probability grounds, that
investors who make a larger number of investments will have a lower success rate
in terms of the proportion of investments that are successful. Moreover, investors
are concerned with the overall success of their portfolios, anticipating that some—
perhaps the majority—of their investments wiU lose money or break even but that
they will make their returns on the small proportion of very successful invest
ments.^ Nevertheless, taking into consideration the evidence on the differences in
deal flow and the investments made (Table 6 ) suggests that successful investors
have the advantage over unsuccessful investors of having a wider range of oppor
tunities to choose from and are more discriminating in those businesses in which
they invest.
Sources of Information on Investment Opportunities
Investors were asked to indicate on a four point scale (1 = regularly, 4 = never)
the importance of various sources of information on deal flow. The clearest differ
ence between successful and unsuccessful investors was that friends are a much
more important source of deal flow for unsuccessful investors (1.6 cf. 2.8). Unsuc
cessful investors are also more likely to rely on their own active search and con
tacts from entrepreneurs, whereas successful investors are more likely to use
newspaper and magazine articles as a source of information on investment oppor
tunities.
Prior Relationship with Investee Companies
A striking difference between the two groups is that unsuccessful investors are
much more likely than successful investors to invest in friends’ businesses. Six out
of eight unsuccessful investors had made investments in friends’ businesses com
pared with only 2 out of the six successful investors, and two-thirds of investments
made by unsuccessful investors (24 out of 36) were in friends’ businesses com
pared with just over 10% (2 of 17) of investments by successful investors.
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Expressed another way, successful investors are much more likely than unsuccess
ful business angels to make investments in businesses in which there is no friend
ship connection with the principals.
Post-investment Relationship
There continues to be controversy as to whether venture capitalists add value
to new businesses (Sapienza, 1992). If it is accepted that business angels can add
value to their investments through their hands on involvement then it might be
expected that successful business angels will have greater involvement with their
investee businesses. On the other hand, greater involvement may not always be
cost-effective and investors must balance the costs against the benefits. Thus, suc
cessful business angels may limit their involvement in order to maximise the return
on the time that they put into their investee businesses (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989).
The evidence indicates that there were no differences between successful and
unsuccessful investors in terms of the roles that they typically play in their investee
businesses (usually board member) nor in the frequency of contact with their
investee businesses (usually a few times a month) nor the amount of time that they
typically spend with their investee businesses (average of 3.5 hours for successful
investors and 4.0 hours for unsuccessful investors). Nevertheless, as unsuccessful
investors have made more investments than successful investors, it is possible that
they have overburdened themselves and have failed to economise on their involve
ment (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994; Fiet, 1995).
These quantitative measures clearly give no indication of the nature of the con
tributions made by investors to their investee companies. This issue was explored
by asking investors to indicate from a list of 2 2 areas of potential involvement their
own perception of the value of the contributions that they have made to their
investee companies. Successful and unsuccessful investors diverge in terms of
their perception of the value of their contributions in 1 2 of these areas of involve
ment. In each case unsuccessful investors had a higher average assessment of the
value of their contribution than did successful investors. Examples of such diver
gences include the following^*^ (the average score for unsuccessful investor is
given first):
•
•
•
•

assisting in negotiations (3.3 cf. 1.7)
introducing new customers and suppliers (3.3 cf. 1.7)
developing new financing chaimels (3.1 cf. 1.3)
assisting in competitor and industry sector analysis (2.9 cf. 1.2 )

However, previous studies of the involvement of both business angels and
venture capitalists in their investee companies, and their value-added contribution.

152

ENTREPRENEURIAL AND SMALL BUSINESS HNANCE

5(2) 1996

indicates that these roles tend to be the least important in adding value (MacMillan,
1989; Harrison & Mason, 1992b).
Performance of Current Investment Portfolio
Past investment success is, of course, not necessarily a guide to future perfor
mance and there is no certainty that successful investors will continue to achieve
profitable exits in the future. Only four of the six successful investors had current
investments. Of these investments, which totalled 13, they judged seven to be per
forming below expectation, two were thought to be performing as expected and
only one was thought to be performing above expectations. Investors said that it
was too early to tell how the other three investments were performing. This com
pares with the unsuccessful investor group who had a total of 17 current invest
ments, of which they considered only six to be performing below expectations and
a further six were performing above expectations. This might suggest that the
investment performance of investors fluctuates over time, and that the fortunes of
the two groups of investors will change in the future. However, an alternative
explanation may be that the unsuccessful group of investors have too optimistic a
view of the performance of their portfolio.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This is the first study to have examined the exits of business angels. However, the
study is based on an extremely small sample and so conclusions must inevitably be
tentative. The findings are, nevertheless, valuable insofar as they provide evidence
on a key aspect of informal venture capital activity where no previous information
existed. Two further limitations of the study should be borne in mind. First, only
one simple measure of exit success is used. A more appropriate measure would be
based on actual cumulative cash flows (although it might be difficult to obtain such
data from private investors). This would also allow an analysis to be made of port
folio returns which is likely to be more relevant, as the modus operandi of venture
capital investing is that a small number of very successful investments should
more than offset those which lose money or break even. Second, the evidence
relates to investors not investments. While it has been possible to build up a gener
alised picture of the investment behaviour of successful and unsuccessful investors
on the basis of their overall investment activity (either all investments or current
portfolio) the implicit assumption has been that the exited investments were not
atypical. Deal-specific information is required in order to make further progress in
understanding the investment performance and exit activity of business angels and
the characteristics of successful and unsuccessful investments.
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The key findings can be grouped under two headings. The first set of findings
relate to aggregate investment performance. The investors in this study achieved a
positive return on only about one-third of their investments. However, about 1 in 5
of all investments were very successful, generating an IRR of over 20%. Invest
ments by private individuals in unquoted companies can therefore be very profit
able. In this sample of Finnish business angels the exit success has been similar to
that for professional venture capital funds. However, this is an inexact comparison
because the exits by business angels have been achieved over a number of years
whereas the venture capital exits refer to a single year. The most common ways in
which business angels harvest their successful investments are by means of a trade
sale or sale to a third party. Where the sale of investments in “living dead” and
loss-making companies is possible, they are normally sold to existing shareholders
in the business.
The second set of findings relate to the identification of differences between
investors in terms of their investment success. This study identified two small sub
groups of investors. One group of six investors had achieved 10 exits, all of which
were successful, and another group of 8 investors who had made 17 exits, none of
which were successful. A number of differences were identified between these two
groups of investors.
(a) Successful investors have spent more of their career in top management
positions in large companies and in middle management posts whereas
unsuccessful investors have spent longer in top management positions in
small companies. However, it is unclear how previous work experience
relates to investment success. Possible links are with the ability to evalu
ate investment opportunities or in managing the investment.
(b) In terms of their motivations for investing, successful investors gave
greater emphasis to the fun and satisfaction of being involved with entre
preneurial venmres, whereas unsuccessful investors gave greater empha
sis to altruistic and social responsibility motives.
(c) Successful investors had a larger flow of investment opportunities and
made fewer investments, implying that they are more discriminating in
making investments.
(d) Unsuccessful investors were more likely to derive deal flow from friends
and to invest in friends’ businesses. This may be either because fiiendship compromises the investment decision or it could be because friend
ship affects the nature of the post-investment relationship, leading to less
value added.
(e) Unsuccessful investors had a higher estimation of their value-added con
tribution to the businesses in which they invested.
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However, because of the nature of the data upon which this study is based
establishing causaUty is problematic. We simply cannot say from the available evi
dence whether business angels with a successful investment performance are suc
cessful because of the superior quality of their flow of information on investment
opportunities, because of their approach to investing or because of the value-added
contribution that they make to their investee businesses.
In view of the critical importance of exit for venture capital investors, it is sur
prising that this is the first ever study to have examined the performance of infor
mal venture capital investments and the exit routes used by business angels.
Although the nature of the available data has limited the scope of the study, and the
geographical context may limit the generalisability of the findings, the paper has
achieved its main purpose of contributing some empirical evidence on a topic
where information was previously non-existent. But clearly much remains to be
discovered and so further research on issues associated with the way in which busi
ness angels harvest their investments should be a high priority. The paper therefore
concludes by sketching out a research agenda.
In the case of the formal, or institutional, venture capital industry the focus of
research has been on the initial public offering (BPO) market (e.g. Bygrave et al,
1994). However, whereas a thriving IPO market is vital to venture capital compa
nies in determining their level of returns (Bygrave, 1994), this is likely to be of lit
tle or no relevance to business angels in view of the relatively small size of their
investments and the stage of business development at which they invest. But while
not excluding the question of the significance of the IPO market for business
angels in any research agenda, a much more important issue concerns the need for
a better understanding of the trade sale process (Relander et al, 1994) which, on the
evidence of this study, is the dominant way in which business angels exit from
their successful investments. It should also be noted that in spite of the attention
that is given to IPOs a trade sale is also the single most important exit route for
venture capital company investors in Europe (Relander et al, 1994; EVCA, 1995).
A number of questions can be highlighted (Relander et al, 1994). First, why is the
ttade sale route favoured by business angels as a means of realising the value of
their investments? Is it the favoured choice amongst alternatives, and if so what are
the advantages, or is it the only realistic exit opportunity available? Second, how is
the acquiring company identified and how is contact made? Is the identification of
an acquiring company one of the value-added contributions of a business angel?
Third, how is the actual timing of the sale determined? Is it planned from the outset
of the investment by the business angel or is it opportunistic? And how is the price
determined? Finally, what is the attitude of the entrepreneur(s) to the exit and to the
exit possibilities? Do the business angel and the entrepreneur have similar objec
tives for an exit?
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NOTES
1. This comparison excludes investments in management buyouts.
2. This phrase was coined by the Center for Venture Research, The Whittemore School of Busi
ness, University of New Hampshire
3. Areas where our understanding of the characteristics and operation of the informal venture cap
ital market and its role in the early stage equity financing market remains limited, and which
represent fruitful lines for further enquiry, have been identified by Freear, Sohl & Wetzel
(1996) in their paper to the 4th State of the Art in Entrepreneurship Research conference and
also by Mason (1996).
4. See Suomi & Lumme (1994) for further details of the methodology.
5. The exchange rate at the time of writing (July 1996) was 4.66 FM = $1.
6. This is the only information that was collected on the performance on individual investments.
We are therefore unable to undertake any analysis on the characteristics of successful and
unsuccessful investments.
7. The full scoring system is as follows: 1 point for a very successful exit (an IRR of more than
20%), 2 points for a moderately successful exit (an IRR of less than 20%), 3 points for an exit
that broke even, 4 points for an investment that resulted in a partial loss and 5 points for an
investment that produced a total loss. See Table 1 for definitions of “very” and “moderately’'
successful.
8. Unfortunately, the data do not enable us to distinguish between management positions in which
they were employees and management positions in their own company. If the companies that
were founded by successful investors were larger (medium-sized) than those founded by unsuc
cessful investors this would account for some of the differences in work experience, although it
would not account for the greater length of time of successful investors in middle management
positions or top management positions in large companies.
9. This is the venture capitalist’s 2:6:2 rule: two investments will fail, six will survive but make
little or no return (the “living dead”) and two will be very successful (Bygrave & Timmons,
1992).
10. 5 = very significant impact, 1 = no impact; 0 = did not participate in that area.
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